Abstract:How should latecomer and catching-up countries dynamically and effectively respond to bet365 new user promo from leading powers？Existing relevant economic theories lack consideration of international relations，The existing international relations theory has insufficient research on the market behavior of micro entities such as enterprises。Constructing a general equilibrium economics theoretical framework that includes the dynamic game of international relations can reveal that when a leading power chooses to technologically contain a catching-up country out of endogenous hegemonic interests，The latter can counter-contain by subsidizing domestic production and R&D，And the optimal subsidy rate increases as the degree of technological restraint increases。Although the subsidy policy may trigger more stringent technological curbs in the short term，But the duration of technical containment will be shortened，And achieve higher welfare levels in the medium to long term。Considering the "moral hazard" issues that subsidy policies may cause in reality，Lately catching up countries also need to adopt other feasible strategies including competition policy。In addition，By enhancing the efficiency of technology spillover from national defense strategic industries to civilian industries，It can also improve the anti-containment capabilities and effects of latecomers and catching-up countries。

　　Keywords:Great power competition, bet365 new user promo, industrial policy, national defense strategic industries

　　AuthorWang Yong，Associate Professor, Institute of bet365 new user promo, Peking University (Beijing 100871)；Zhao Changwen，Professor of Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University (Guangzhou 510275)；Jiang Shenzhe，Assistant Professor, Institute of bet365 new user promo, Peking University (Beijing 100871)。